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Abstract—Voice interfaces are becoming accepted widely as
input methods for a diverse set of devices. This development
is driven by rapid improvements in automatic speech recogni-
tion (ASR), which now performs on par with human listening in
many tasks. These improvements base on an ongoing evolution of
deep neural networks (DNNs) as the computational core of ASR.
However, recent research results show that DNNs are vulnerable
to adversarial perturbations, which allow attackers to force the
transcription into a malicious output.
In this paper, we introduce a new type of adversarial examples
based on psychoacoustic hiding. Our attack exploits the character-
istics of DNN-based ASR systems, where we extend the original
analysis procedure by an additional backpropagation step. We
use this backpropagation to learn the degrees of freedom for
the adversarial perturbation of the input signal, i.e., we apply a
psychoacoustic model and manipulate the acoustic signal below
the thresholds of human perception. To further minimize the
perceptibility of the perturbations, we use forced alignment to
find the best fitting temporal alignment between the original
audio sample and the malicious target transcription. These
extensions allow us to embed an arbitrary audio input with a
malicious voice command that is then transcribed by the ASR
system, with the audio signal remaining barely distinguishable
from the original signal. In an experimental evaluation, we
attack the state-of-the-art speech recognition system Kaldi and
determine the best performing parameter and analysis setup for
different types of input. Our results show that we are successful
in up to 98% of cases with a computational effort of fewer than
two minutes for a ten-second audio file. Based on user studies,
we found that none of our target transcriptions were audible to
human listeners, who still understand the original speech content
with unchanged accuracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hello darkness, my old friend. I’ve come to talk with
you again. Because a vision softly creeping left its seeds
while I was sleeping. And the vision that was planted
in my brain still remains, within the sound of silence.
Simon & Garfunkel, The Sound of Silence
Motivation. Deep neural networks (DNNs) have evolved
into the state-of-the-art approach for many machine learning
tasks, including automatic speech recognition (ASR) sys-
tems [59], [45]. The recent success of DNN-based ASR
systems is due to a number of factors, most importantly their
power to model large vocabularies and their ability to perform
speaker-independent and also highly robust speech recogni-
tion. As a result, they can cope with complex, real-world
environments that are typical for many speech interaction
scenarios such as voice interfaces. In practice, the importance
of DNN-based ASR systems is steadily increasing, e. g.,
within smartphones or stand-alone devices such as Amazon’s
Echo/Alexa.
On the downside, their success also comes at a price:
the number of necessary parameters is significantly larger
than that of the previous state-of-the-art Gaussian-Mixture-
Model probability densities within Hidden Markov Models
(so-called GMM-HMM systems) [41]. As a consequence, this
high number of parameters gives an adversary much space
to explore (and potentially exploit) blind spots that enable
her to mislead an ASR system. Possible attack scenarios
include unseen requests to ASR assistant systems, which may
reveal private information. Diao et al. demonstrated that such
attacks are feasible with the help of a malicious app on
a smartphone [15]. Attacks over radio or TV, which could
affect a large number of victims, are another attack scenario.
This could lead to unwanted online shopping orders, which
has already happened on normally uttered commands over
TV commercials, as Amazon’s devices have reacted to the
purchase command [32]. As ASR systems are also often
included into smart home setups, this may lead to a significant
vulnerability and in a worst-case scenario, an attacker may
be able to take over the entire smart home system, including
security cameras or alarm systems.
Adversarial Examples. The general question if ML-based
systems can be secure has been investigated in the past [7], [6],
[28] and some works have helped to elucidate the phenomenon
of adversarial examples [20], [17], [18], [49], [27]. Much re-
cent work on this topic focussed on image classification: differ-
ent types of adversarial examples have been investigated [34],
[10], [16] and in response, several types of countermeasures
have been proposed [21], [13], [62]. These countermeasures
are focused on only classification-based recognition and some
approaches remain resistant [10]. As the recognition of ASR
systems operates differently due to time dependencies, such
countermeasures will not work equally in the audio domain.
In the audio domain, Vaidya et al. were among the first to
explore adversarial examples against ASR systems [54]. They
showed how an input signal (i. e., audio file) can be modified
to fit the target transcription by considering the features instead
of the output of the DNN. On the downside, the results show
high distortions of the audio signal and a human can easily
perceive the attack. Carlini et al. introduced so-called hidden
voice commands and demonstrated that targeted attacks against
HMM-only ASR systems are feasible [9]. They use inverse
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feature extraction to create adversarial audio samples. Still, the
resulting audio samples are not intelligible by humans (in most
of the cases) and may be considered as noise, but may make
thoughtful listeners suspicious. To overcome this limitation,
Zhang et al. proposed so-called DolphinAttacks: they showed
that it is possible to hide a transcription by utilizing non-
linearities of microphones to modulate the baseband audio
signal with ultrasound higher than 20 kHz [63]. The drawback
of this and similar ultrasound-based attacks [50], [44] is that
the attack is costly as the information to manipulate the
input features needs to be retrieved from recordings of audio
signals with the specific microphone, which is used for the
attack. Additionally, the modulation is tailored to a specific
microphone, such that the result may differ if another micro-
phone is used. Recently and concurrently, Carlini and Wagner
published a technical report in which they introduce a general
targeted attack on ASR systems using connectionist temporal
classication (CTC) loss [11]. Similarly to previous adversarial
attacks on image classifiers, it works with a gradient-descent-
based minimization [10], but it replaces the loss function by
the CTC-loss, which is optimized for time sequences. On the
downside, the constraint for the minimization of the difference
between original and adversarial sample is also borrowed from
adversarial attacks on images and therefore does not consider
the limits and sensitivities of human auditory perception.
Additionally, the algorithm often does not converge. This
is solved by multiple initializations of the algorithm, which
leads to high run-time requirements—in the order of hours
of computing time—to calculate an adversarial example. Also
very recently, Yuan et al. described CommanderSong, which
is able to hide transcripts within music [61]. However, this
approach is only shown to be successful in music and it does
not contain a human-perception-based noise reduction.
Contributions. In this paper, we introduce a novel type
of adversarial examples against ASR systems based on psy-
choacoustic hiding. We utilize psychoacoustic modeling, as
in MP3 encoding, in order to reduce the perceptible noise.
For this purpose, hearing thresholds are calculated based on
psychoacoustic experiments by Zwicker et al. [64]. This limits
the adversarial perturbations to those parts of the original
audio sample, where they are not (or hardly) perceptible by
a human. Furthermore, we use backpropagation as one part
of the algorithm to find adversarial examples with minimal
perturbations. This algorithm has already been successfully
used for adversarial examples in other settings [10], [11]. To
show the general feasibility of psychoacoustic attacks, we feed
the audio signal directly into the recognizer.
A key feature of our approach is the integration of the
preprocessing step into the backpropagation. As a result, it
is possible to change the raw audio signal without further
steps. The preprocessing operates as a feature extraction and
is fundamental to the accuracy of an ASR system. Due to the
differentiability of each single preprocessing step, we are able
to include it in the backpropagation without the necessity to
invert the feature extraction. In addition, ASR highly depends
on temporal alignment as it is a continuous process. We
enhance our attack by computing an optimal alignment with
the forced alignment algorithm, which calculates the best
starting point for the backpropagation. Hence, we make sure
to move the target transcription into parts of the original audio
sample which are the most promising to not be perceivable by
a human. We optimize the algorithm to provide a high success
rate and to minimize the perceptible noise.
We have implemented the proposed attack to demonstrate
the practical feasibility of our approach. We evaluated it
against the state-of-the-art DNN-HMM-based ASR system
Kaldi [40], which is one of the most popular toolchains for
ASR among researchers [1], [19], [29], [30], [42], [43], [52],
[53], [55], [61] and is also used in commercial products such
as Amazon’s Echo/Alexa and by IBM and Microsoft [4], [60].
Note that commercial ASR systems do not provide information
about their system setup and configuration.
Such information could be extracted via model stealing and
similar attacks (e. g., [22], [39], [51], [36], [56]). However,
such an end-to-end attack would go beyond the contributions
of this work and hence we focus on the general feasibility of
adversarial attacks on state-of-the-art ASR systems in a white-
box setting. More specifically, we show that it is possible
to hide any target transcription in any audio file with a
minimum of perceptible noise in up to 98 % of cases. We
analyze the optimal parameter settings, including different
phone rates, allowed deviations from the hearing thresholds,
and the number of iterations for the backpropagation. We need
less than two minutes on an Intel Core i7 processor to generate
an adversarial example for a ten-second audio file. We also
demonstrate that it is possible to limit the perturbations to
parts of the original audio files, where they are not (or only
barely) perceptible by humans. The experiments show that in
comparison to other targeted attacks [61], the amount of noise
is significantly reduced.
This observation is confirmed during a two-part audibility
study, where test listeners transcribe adversarial examples and
rate the quality of different settings. The results of the first
user study indicate that it is impossible to comprehend the
target transcription of adversarial perturbations and only the
original transcription is recognized by human listeners. The
second part of the listening test is a MUSHRA test [46] in
order to rate the quality of different algorithm setups. The
results show that the psychoacoustic model greatly increases
the quality of the adversarial examples.
In summary, we make the following contributions in this paper:
• Psychoacoustic Hiding. We describe a novel type of
adversarial examples against DNN-HMM-based ASR
systems based on a psychoacoustically designed attack
for hiding transcriptions in arbitrary audio files. Besides
the psychoacoustic modeling, the algorithm utilizes an
optimal temporal alignment and backpropagation up to
the raw audio file.
• Experimental Evaluation. We evaluate the proposed
attack algorithm in different settings in order to find
adversarial perturbations that lead to the best recognition
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1. pre-
processing
2. DNN
3. decoding
raw audio features
pseudo-
posteriors transcription
”HELLO DARKNESS
MY OLD FRIEND”
Fig. 1: Overview of a state-of-the-art ASR system with the three main components of the ASR system: (1) preprocessing of
the raw audio data, (2) calculating pseudo-posteriors with a DNN, and (3) the decoding, which returns the transcription.
result with the least human-perceptible noise.
• User Study. To measure the human perception of adver-
sarial audio samples, we performed a user study. More
specifically, human listeners were asked to transcribe
what they understood when presented with adversarial
examples and to compare their overall audio quality
compared to original unmodified audio files.
A demonstration of our attack is available online at http://
adversarial-asr.selfip.org where we present several adversarial
audio files generated for different kinds of attack scenarios.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
Neural networks have become prevalent in many machine
learning tasks, including modern ASR systems. Formally
speaking, they are just functions y = F (x), mapping some
input x to its corresponding output y. Training these networks
requires the adaptation of hundreds of thousands of free
parameters. The option to train such models by just presenting
input-output pairs during the training process makes deep
neural networks (DNNs) so appealing for many researchers.
At the same time, this represents the Achilles’ heel of these
systems that we are going to exploit for our ASR attack. In
the following, we provide the technical background as far as
it is necessary to understand the details of our approach.
A. Speech Recognition Systems
There is a variety of commercial and non-commercial ASR
systems available. In the research community, Kaldi [40] is
very popular given that it is an open-source toolkit which
provides a wide range of state-of-the-art algorithms for ASR.
The tool was developed at Johns Hopkins University and is
written in C++. We performed a partial reverse engineering of
the firmware of an Amazon Echo and our results indicate that
this device also uses Kaldi internally to process audio inputs.
Given Kaldi’s popularity and its accessibility, this ASR system
hence represents an optimal fit for our experiments. Figure 1
provides an overview of the main system components that we
are going to describe in more detail below.
1) Preprocessing Audio Input: Preprocessing of the audio
input is a synonym for feature extraction: this step transforms
the raw input data into features that should ideally preserve all
relevant information (e. g., phonetic class information, formant
structure, etc.), while discarding the unnecessary remainder
(e. g., properties of the room impulse response, residual noise,
or voice properties like pitch information). For the feature
extraction in this paper, we divide the input waveform into
overlapping frames of fixed length. Each frame is transformed
individually using the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) to
obtain a frequency domain representation. We calculate the
logarithm of the magnitude spectrum, a very common feature
representation for ASR systems. A detailed description is
given in Section III-E, where we explain the necessary inte-
gration of this particular preprocessing into our ASR system.
2) Neural Network: Like many statistical models, an artifi-
cial neural network can learn very general input/output map-
pings from training data. For this purpose, so-called neurons
are arranged in layers and these layers are stacked on top of
each other and are connected by weighted edges to form a
DNN. Their parameters, i. e., the weights, are adapted during
the training of the network. In the context of ASR, DNNs
can be used differently. The most attractive and most difficult
application would be the direct transformation of the spoken
text at the input to a character transcription of the same text at
the output. This is referred to as an end-to-end-system. Kaldi
takes a different route: it uses a more conventional Hidden
Markov Model (HMM) representation in the decoding stage
and uses the DNN to model the probability of all HMM
states (modeling context-dependent phonetic units) given the
acoustic input signal. Therefore, the outputs of the DNN are
pseudo-posteriors, which are used during the decoding step in
order to find the most likely word sequence.
3) Decoding: Decoding in ASR systems, in general, uti-
lizes some form of graph search for the inference of the most
probable word sequence from the acoustic signal. In Kaldi,
a static decoding graph is constructed as a composition of
individual transducers (i. e., graphs with input/output symbol
mappings attached to the edges). These individual transducers
describe for example the grammar, the lexicon, context depen-
dency of context-dependent phonetic units, and the transition
and output probability functions of these phonetic units. The
transducers and the pseudo-posteriors (i. e., the output of the
DNN) are then used to find an optimal path through the word
graph.
B. Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial attacks can, in general, be applied to any kind of
machine learning system [7], [6], [28], but they are successful
especially for DNNs [37], [20].
As noted above, a trained DNN maps an input x to an
output y = F (x). In the case of a trained ASR system, this
is a mapping of the features into estimated pseudo-posteriors.
Unfortunately, this mapping is not well defined in all cases due
to the high number of parameters in the DNN, which leads
to a very complex function F (x). Insufficient generalization
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of F (x) can lead to blind spots, which may not be obvious
to humans. We exploit this weakness by using a manipulated
input x′ that closely resembles the original input x, but leads
to a different mapping:
x′ = x+ δ, such that F (x) 6= F (x′),
where we minimize any additional noise δ such that it stays
close to the hearing threshold. For the minimization, we use
a model of human audio signal perception. This is easy for
cases where no specific target y′ is defined. In the following,
we show that adversarial examples can even be created very
reliably for targeted attacks, where the output y′ is defined.
C. Backpropagation
Backpropagation is an optimization algorithm for computa-
tional graphs (like those of neural networks) based on gradient
descent. It is normally used during the training of DNNs to
learn the optimal weights. With only minor changes, it is pos-
sible to use the same algorithm to create adversarial examples
from arbitrary inputs. For this purpose, the parameters of the
DNN are kept unchanged and only the input vector is updated.
For backpropagation, three components are necessary:
1) Measure loss. The difference between the actual out-
put yi = F (xi) and the target output y′ is measured
with a loss function L(yi, y′). The index i denotes the
current iteration step, as backpropagation is an iterative
algorithm. The cross-entropy, a commonly used loss
function for DNNs with classification tasks, is employed
here
L(yi, y
′) = −
∑
yi log(y
′).
2) Calculate gradient. The loss is back-propagated to the
input xi of the neural network. For this purpose, the
gradient ∇xi is calculated by partial derivatives and the
chain rule
∇xi = ∂L(yi, y
′)
∂xi
=
∂L(yi, y
′)
∂F (xi)
· ∂F (xi)
∂xi
. (1)
The derivative of F (xi) depends on the topology of the
neural network and is also calculated via the chain rule,
going backward through the different layers.
3) Update. The input is updated according to the back-
propagated gradient and a learning rate α via
xi+1 = xi −∇xi · α.
These steps are repeated until convergence or until an
upper limit for the number of iterations is reached. With this
algorithm, it is possible to approximately solve problems iter-
atively, which cannot be solved analytically. Backpropagation
is guaranteed to find a minimum, but not necessarily the global
minimum. As there is not only one solution for a specific target
transcription, it is sufficient for us to find any solution for a
valid adversarial example.
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Fig. 2: Hearing threshold of test tone (dashed line) masked
by a LCB = 60dB tone at 1 kHz [64]. In green, the hearing
threshold in quiet is shown.
D. Psychoacoustic Modeling
Psychoacoustic hearing thresholds describe how the depen-
dencies between frequencies lead to masking effects in the
human perception. Probably the best-known example for this
is MP3 compression [23], where the compression algorithm
applies a set of empirical hearing thresholds to the input
signal. By removing those parts of the input signal that are
inaudible by human perception, the original input signal can
be transformed into a smaller but lossy representation.
1) Hearing Thresholds: MP3 compression depends on an
empirical set of hearing thresholds that define how depen-
dencies between certain frequencies can mask, i. e., make
inaudible, other parts of an audio signal. When applied to
the frequency domain representation of an input signal, the
thresholds indicate which parts of the signal can be altered
in the following quantization step, and hence, help to com-
press the input. We utilize this psychoacoustic model for
our manipulations of the signal, i. e., we apply it as a rule
set to add inaudible noise. We derive the respective set of
thresholds for an audio input from the psychoacoustic model
of MP3 compression. In Figure 2 an example for a single
tone masker is shown. Here, the green line represents the
human hearing thresholds in quiet over the complete human-
perceptible frequency range. In case of a masking tone, this
threshold increases, reflecting the decrease in sensitivity in the
frequencies around the test tone. In Figure 2 this is shown for
1 kHz and 60 dB.
2) MP3 Compression: We receive the original input data
in buffers of 1024 samples length that consist of two 576
sample granule windows. One of these windows is the current
granule, the other is the previous granule that we use for
comparison. We use the fast Fourier transform to derive 32
frequency bands from both granules and break this spec-
trum into MPEG ISO [23] specified scale factor bands. This
segmentation of frequency bands helps to analyze the input
signal according to its acoustic characteristics, as the hearing
thresholds and masking effects directly relate to the individual
bands. We measure this segmentation of bands in bark, a
subjective measurement of frequency. Using this bark scale,
we estimate the relevance of each band and compute its energy.
In the following steps of the MP3 compression, the thresh-
olds for each band indicate which parts of the frequency do-
main can be removed while maintaining a certain audio quality
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during quantization. In the context of our work, we use the
hearing thresholds as a guideline for acceptable manipulations
of the input signal. They describe the amount of energy that
can be added to the input in each individual window of the
signal. An example of such a matrix is visualized in Figure 5d.
The matrices are always normalized in such a way that the
largest time-frequency-bin energy is limited to 95 dB.
III. ATTACKING ASR VIA PSYCHOACOUSTIC HIDING
In the following, we show how the audible noise can be
limited by applying hearing thresholds during the creation of
adversarial examples. As an additional challenge, we need to
find the optimal temporal alignment, which gives us the best
starting point for the insertion of malicious perturbations. Note
that our attack integrates well into the DNN-based speech
recognition process: we use the trained ASR system and
apply backpropagation to update the input, eventually resulting
in adversarial examples. A demonstration of our attack is
available at http://adversarial-asr.selfip.org.
A. Adversary Model
Throughout the rest of this paper, we assume the following
adversary model. First, we assume a white-box attack, where
the adversary knows the ASR mechanism of the attacked
system. Using this knowledge, the attacker generates audio
samples containing malicious perturbations before the actual
attack takes place, i. e., the attacker exploits the ASR system
to obtain an audio file that produces the desired recognition
result. Second, we assume the ASR system to be configured
in such a way that it gives the best possible recognition rate.
In addition, the trained ASR system, including the DNN,
remains unchanged over time. Finally, we assume a perfect
transmission channel for replaying the manipulated audio
samples, hence, we do not take perturbations through audio
codecs, compression, hardware, etc. into account by feeding
the audio file directly into the recognizer. Note that we only
consider targeted attacks, where the target transcription is
predefined (i. e., the adversary chooses the target sentence).
B. High-Level Overview
The algorithm for the calculation of adversarial examples
can be divided into three parts, which are sketched in Figure 3.
Before the backpropagation, the best possible temporal align-
ment is calculated via so-called forced alignment. The algo-
rithm uses the original audio signal and the target transcription
as inputs in order to find the best target pseudo-posteriors. The
forced alignment is performed once at the beginning of the
algorithm.
With the resulting target, we are able to apply backpropa-
gation to manipulate our input signal in such a way that the
speech recognition system transcribes the desired output. The
backpropagation is an iterative process and will, therefore, be
repeated until it converges or a fixed upper limit for the number
of iterations is reached.
The hearing thresholds are applied during the backpropa-
gation in order to limit the changes that are perceptible by a
1. forced alignment
2. backpropagation
3. hearing thresholds
HMM
L(y, y′)
pseudo-
posteriors
target
y
y′
”DEACTIVATE SECURITY
CAMERA AND UNLOCK
FRONT DOOR”
target
transcription
∇x
−α
raw audio
calculate
hearing
thresholds
”HELLO DARKNESS
MY OLD FRIEND”
original audio
Fig. 3: The creation of adversarial examples can be divided
into three components: (1) forced alignment to find an optimal
target for the (2) backpropagation and the integration of (3) the
hearing thresholds.
human. The hearing thresholds are also calculated once and
stored for the backpropagation. A detailed description of the
integration is provided in Section III-F.
C. Forced Alignment
One major problem of attacks against ASR systems is
that they require the recognition to pass through a certain
sequence of HMM states in such a way that it leads to
the target transcription. However, due to the decoding step—
which includes a graph search—for a given transcription, many
valid pseudo-posterior combinations exist. For example, when
the same text is spoken at different speeds, the sequence
of the HMM states is correspondingly faster or slower. We
can benefit from this fact by using that version of pseudo-
posteriors which best fits the given audio signal and the desired
target transcription.
We use forced alignment as an algorithm for finding the best
possible temporal alignment between the acoustic signal that
we manipulate and the transcription that we wish to obtain.
This algorithm is provided by the Kaldi toolkit. Note that it is
not always possible to find an alignment that fits an audio file
to any target transcription. In this case, we set the alignment
by dividing the audio sample equally into the number of states
and set the target according to this division.
D. Integrating Preprocessing
We integrate the preprocessing step and the DNN step into
one joint DNN. This approach is sketched in Figure 4. The
input for the preprocessing is the same as in Figure 1, and the
pseudo-posteriors are also unchanged.
This design choice does not affect the accuracy of the ASR
system, but it allows for manipulating the raw audio data by
applying backpropagation to the preprocessing steps, directly
giving us the optimally adversarial audio signal as result.
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E. Backpropagation
Due to this integration of preprocessing into the DNN,
Equation (1) has to be extended to
∇x = ∂L(y, y
′)
∂F (χ)
· ∂F (χ)
∂FP (x)
· ∂FP (x)
∂x
,
where we ignore the iteration index i for simplicity. All
preprocessing steps are included in χ = FP (x) and return the
input features χ for the DNN. In order to calculate ∂FP (x)∂x ,
it is necessary to know the derivatives of each of the four
preprocessing steps. We will introduce these preprocessing
steps and the corresponding derivatives in the following.
1) Framing and Window Function: In the first step, the raw
audio data is divided into T frames of length N and a window
function is applied to each frame. A window function is a
simple, element-wise multiplication with fixed values w(n)
xw(t, n) = x(t, n) · w(n), n = 0, . . . , N − 1,
with t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Thus, the derivative is just
∂xw(t, n)
∂x(t, n)
= w(n).
2) Discrete Fourier Transform: For transforming the audio
signal into the frequency domain, we apply a DFT to each
frame xw. This transformation is a common choice for audio
features. The DFT is defined as
X(t, k) =
N−1∑
n=0
xw(t, n)e
−i2pi knN , k = 0, . . . , N − 1.
In Figure 4 the DFT layer is shown schematically as Layer 2
of the preprocessing sub-DNN. Since the DFT is a weighted
sum with fixed coefficients e−i2pi
kn
N , the derivative for the
backpropagation is simply the corresponding coefficient
∂X(t, k)
∂xw(t, n)
= e−i2pi
kn
N , k, n = 0, . . . , N − 1.
3) Magnitude: The output of the DFT is complex valued,
but as the phase is not relevant for speech recognition, we just
use the magnitude of the spectrum, which is defined as
|X(t, k)|2 = a(t, k)2 + b(t, k)2,
with a(t, k) = Re(X(t, k)),
b(t, k) = Im(X(t, k)),
with Re(X(t, k)) and Im(X(t, k)) as the real and imaginary
part of X(t, k). For the backpropagation, we need the deriva-
tive of the magnitude. In general, this is not well defined and
allows two solutions,
∂|X(t, k)|2
∂X(t, k)
=
{
2 · a(t, k)
2 · b(t, k) .
We circumvent this problem by considering the real and
imaginary parts separately and calculate the derivatives for
both cases
∇X(t, k) =
(
∂|X(t,k)|2
∂ Re(X(t,k))
∂|X(t,k)|2
∂ Im(X(t,k))
)
=
(
2 · Re(X(t, k))
2 · Im(X(t, k))
)
. (2)
1. preprocessing 2. DNN
raw audio
pseudo-
posteriors
4321
x(1)
x(2)
. . .
x(N)
χ = FP (x) y = F (χ)
Fig. 4: For the creation of adversarial samples, we use an ASR
system where the preprocessing is integrated into the DNN.
Layers 1–4 represent the separate preprocessing steps.
This is possible, as real and imaginary parts are stored
separately during the calculation of the DNN, which is also
sketched in Figure 4, where pairs of nodes from layer 2
are connected with only one corresponding node in layer 3.
Layer 3 represents the calculation of the magnitude and
therefore halves the data size.
4) Logarithm: The last step is to form the logarithm of the
squared magnitude χ = log(|X(t, k)|2), which is the common
feature representation in speech recognition systems. It is easy
to find its derivative as
∂χ
∂|X(t, k)|2 =
1
|X(t, k)|2 .
F. Hearing Thresholds
Psychoacoustic hearing thresholds allow us to limit audible
distortions from all signal manipulations. More specifically,
we use the hearing thresholds during the manipulation of the
input signal in order to limit audible distortions. For this
purpose, we use the original audio signal to calculate the
hearing thresholds H as described in Section II-D. We limit
the differences D between the original signal spectrum S and
the modified signal spectrum M to the threshold of human
perception for all times t and frequencies k
D(t, f) ≤ H(t, k), ∀t, k,
with D(t, k) = 20 · log10
|S(t, k)−M(t, k)|
maxt,k(|S|) .
The maximum value of the power spectrum |S| defines the
reference value for each utterance, which is necessary to
calculate the difference in dB. Examples for |S|, |M|, |D|,
and H in dB are plotted in Figure 5, where the power spectra
are plotted for one utterance.
We calculate the amount of distortion that is still accept-
able via
Φ = H−D. (3)
The resulting matrix Φ contains the difference in dB to the
calculated hearing thresholds.
In the following step, we use the matrix Φ to derive scaling
factors. First, because the thresholds are tight, an additional
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(a) Original audio signal power spectrum |S| with transcription:
“THE DISNEY PROJECT IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION IN NINE-
TEEN EIGHTY EIGHT AT AN ESTIMATED COST OF TWO HUNDRED AND
FIFTY MILLION.”
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(b) Adversarial audio signal power spectrum |M| with tran-
scription: “I AM A SPACE INVADER COMING FOR YOU.”
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(c) The power spectrum of the difference between original and
adversarial |D|.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Seconds
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
kH
z
-50
0
50
dB
(d) Hearing thresholds H.
Fig. 5: Original audio sample (5a) in comparison to the adversarial audio sample (5b). The difference of both signals is shown
in Figure 5c. Figure 5d visualizes the hearing thresholds of the original sample, which are used for the attack algorithm.
variable λ is added, to allow the algorithm to differ from the
hearing thresholds by small amounts
Φ∗ = Φ + λ. (4)
In general, a negative value for Φ∗(t, k) indicates that we
crossed the threshold. As we want to avoid more noise for
these time-frequency-bins, we set all Φ∗(t, k) < 0 to zero.
We then obtain a time-frequency matrix of scale factors Φˆ by
normalizing Φ∗ to values between zero and one, via
Φˆ(t, k) =
Φ∗(t, k)−mint,k(Φ∗)
maxt,k(Φ∗)−mint,k(Φ∗) , ∀t, k.
The scaling factors are applied during each backpropagation
iteration. Using the resulting scaling factors Φˆ(t, k) typically
leads to good results, but especially in the cases where only
very small changes are acceptable, this scaling factor alone
is not enough to satisfy the hearing thresholds. Therefore, we
use another, fixed scaling factor, which only depends on the
hearing thresholds H. For this purpose, H is also scaled to
values between zero and one, denoted by Hˆ.
Therefore, the gradient ∇X(t, k) calculated via Equa-
tion (2) between the DFT and the magnitude step is scaled
by both scaling factors
∇X∗(t, k) = ∇X(t, k) · Φˆ(t, k) · Hˆ(t, k), ∀t, k.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
With the help of the following experiments, we verify and
assess the proposed attack. We target the ASR system Kaldi
and use it for our speech recognition experiments. We also
compare the influence of the suggested improvements to the
algorithm and assess the influence of significant parameter
settings on the success of the adversarial attack.
A. Experimental Setup
To verify the feasibility of targeted adversarial attacks
on state-of-the-art ASR systems, we have used the default
settings for the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) training recipe
of the Kaldi toolkit [40]. Only the preprocessing step was
adapted for the integration into the DNN. The WSJ data set is
well suited for large vocabulary ASR: it is phone-based and
contains more than 80 hours of training data, composed of read
sentences of the Wall Street Journal recorded under mostly
clean conditions. Due to the large dictionary with more than
100, 000 words, this setup is suitable to show the feasibility
of targeted adversarial attacks for arbitrary transcriptions.
For the evaluation, we embedded the hidden voice com-
mands (i. e., target transcription) in two types of audio data:
speech and music. We collect and compare results with and
without the application of hearing thresholds, and with and
without the use of forced alignment. All computations were
performed on a 6-core Intel Core i7-4960X processor.
B. Metrics
In the following, we describe the metrics that we used to
measure recognition accuracy and to assess to which degree
the perturbations of the adversarial attacks needed to exceed
hearing thresholds in each of our algorithm’s variants.
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Fig. 6: Comparison of the algorithm with and without forced
alignment, evaluated for different values of λ.
1) Word Error Rate: As the adversarial examples are pri-
marily designed to fool an ASR system, a natural metric for
our success is the accuracy with which the target transcription
was actually recognized. For this purpose, we use the Leven-
shtein distance [33] to calculate the word error rate (WER).
A dynamic-programming algorithm is employed to count the
number of deleted D, inserted I , and substituted S words in
comparison to the total number of words N in the sentence,
which together allows for determining the word error rate via
WER =
D + I + S
N
.
When the adversarial example is based on audio samples with
speech, it is possible that the original text is transcribed instead
of—or in addition to—the target transcription. Therefore, it
can happen that many words are inserted, possibly even more
words than contained in the target text. This can lead to WERs
larger than 100 %, which can also be observed in Table I,
and which is not uncommon when testing ASR systems under
highly unfavorable conditions.
2) Difference Measure: To determine the amount of percep-
tible noise, measures like the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) are
not sufficient given that they do not represent the subjective,
perceptible noise. Hence, we have used Φ of Equation (3)
to obtain a comparable measure of audible noise. For this
purpose, we only consider values > 0, as only these are in
excess of the hearing thresholds. This may happen when λ
is set to values larger than zero, or where changes in one
frequency bin also affect adjacent bins.
We sum all values Φ(t, k) > 0 for t = 0, . . . , T−1 and k =
0, . . . , N − 1 and divide the sum by T ·N for normalization.
This value is denoted by φ. It constitutes our measure of the
degree of perceptibility of noise.
C. Improving the Attack
As a baseline, we used a simplified version of the algorithm,
forgoing both the hearing thresholds and the forced alignment
stage. In the second scenario, we included the proposed
hearing thresholds. This minimizes the amount of added noise
but also decreases the chance of a valid adversarial example. In
the final scenario, we added the forced alignment step, which
results in the full version of the suggested algorithm, with a
clearly improved WER.
For the experiments, a subset of 70 utterances for 10
different speakers from one of the WSJ test sets was used.
1) Backpropagation: First, the adversarial attack algorithm
was applied without the hearing thresholds or the forced
alignment. Hence, for the alignment, the audio sample was
divided equally into the states of the target transcription. We
used 500 iterations of backpropagation. This gives robust
results and requires a reasonable time for computation. We
chose a learning rate of 0.05, as it gave the best results during
preliminary experiments. This learning rate was also used for
all following experiments.
For the baseline test, we achieved a WER of 1.43 %, but
with perceptible noise. This can be seen in the average φ,
which was 11.62 dB for this scenario. This value indicates that
the difference is clearly perceptible. However, the small WER
shows that targeted attacks on ASR systems are possible and
that our approach of backpropagation into the time domain
can very reliably produce valid adversarial audio samples.
2) Hearing Thresholds: Since the main goal of the algo-
rithm is the reduction of the perceptible noise, we included
the hearing thresholds as described in Section III-F. For this
setting, we ran the same test as before.
In this case, the WER increases to 64.29 %, but it is still
possible to create valid adversarial samples. On the positive
side, the perceptible noise is clearly reduced. This is also
indicated by the much smaller value of φ of only 7.04 dB.
We chose λ = 20 in this scenario, which has been shown
to be a good trade-off. The choice of λ highly influences the
WER, a more detailed analysis can be found in Table I.
3) Forced Alignment: To evaluate the complete system, we
replaced the equal alignment by forced alignment. Again, the
same test set and the same settings as in the previous scenarios
were used. Figure 6 shows a comparison of the algorithm’s
performance with and without forced alignment for different
values of λ. The parameter λ is defined in Equation (4) and
describes the amount the result can differ from the thresholds
in dB. As the thresholds are tight, this parameter can influence
the success rate but does not necessarily increase the amount
of noise. In all relevant cases, the WER and φ show better
results with forced alignment. The only exception is the one
case of λ = 0, where the WER is very high in all scenarios.
In the specific case of λ = 20, set as in Section IV-C2, a
WER of 36.43 % was achieved. This result shows the signifi-
cant advantage of the forced alignment step. At the same time,
the noise was again noticeably reduced, with φ = 5.49 dB.
This demonstrates that the best temporal alignment noticeably
increases the success rate in the sense of the WER, while at
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TABLE I: WER in % for different values for λ in the range of
0 dB to 50 dB, comparing speech and music as audio inputs.
Iter. None 50 dB 40 dB 30 dB 20 dB 10 dB 0 dB
Speech 500 2.14 6.96 11.07 16.43 36.43 92.69 138.211000 1.79 3.93 5.00 7.50 22.32 76.96 128.93
Music 500 1.04 8.16 13.89 22.74 31.77 60.07 77.081000 1.22 10.07 9.55 15.10 31.60 56.42 77.60
the same time reducing the amount of noise—a rare win-win
situation in the highly optimized domain of ASR. In Figure 5,
an example of an original spectrum of an audio sample is
compared with the corresponding adversarial audio sample.
One can see the negligible differences between both signals.
The added noise is plotted in Figure 5c. Figure 5d depicts the
hearing thresholds of the same utterance, which were used in
the attack algorithm.
D. Evaluation
In the next steps, the optimal settings are evaluated, con-
sidering the success rate, the amount of noise, and the time
required to generate valid adversarial examples.
1) Evaluation of Hearing Thresholds: In Table I, the results
for speech and music samples are shown for 500 and for
1000 iterations of backpropagation, respectively. The value
in the first row shows the setting of λ. For comparison, the
case without the use of hearing thresholds is shown in the
column ‘None.’ We applied all combinations of settings on
a test set of speech containing 72 samples and a test set of
music containing 70 samples. The test set of speech was the
same as for the previous evaluations and the target text was
the same for all audio samples.
The results in Table I show the dependence on the number
of iterations and on λ. The higher the number of iterations and
the higher λ, the lower the WER becomes. The experiments
with music show some exceptions to this rule, as a higher
number of iterations slightly increases the WER in some cases.
However, this is only true where no thresholds were employed
or for λ = 50.
As is to be expected, the best WER results were achieved
when the hearing thresholds were not applied. However, the
results with applied thresholds show that it is indeed feasible
to find a valid adversarial example very reliably even when
minimizing human perceptibility.Even for the last column,
where the WER increases to more than 100 %, it was still
possible to create valid adversarial examples, as we will show
in the following evaluations.
In Table II, the corresponding values for the mean per-
ceptibility φ are shown. In contrast to the WER, the value
φ decreases with λ, which shows the general success of the
thresholds, as smaller values indicate a smaller perceptibility.
Especially when no thresholds are used, φ is significantly
higher than in all other cases. The evaluation of music samples
shows smaller values of φ in all cases, which indicates that it
is much easier to conceal adversarial examples in music. This
was also confirmed by the listening tests (cf. Section V).
TABLE II: The perceptibility φ over all samples in the test
sets in dB.
Iter. None 50 dB 40 dB 30 dB 20 dB 10 dB 0 dB
Speech 500 10.11 6.67 6.53 5.88 5.49 4.70 3.051000 10.80 7.42 7.54 6.85 6.46 5.72 3.61
Music 500 4.92 3.92 3.56 3.53 3.39 2.98 2.021000 5.03 3.91 3.68 3.40 3.49 3.20 2.30
2) Phone Rate Evaluation: For the attack, timing changes
are not relevant as long as the target text is recognized
correctly. Therefore, we have tested different combinations of
audio input and target text, measuring the number of phones
that we could hide per second of audio, to find an optimum
phone rate for our ASR system. For this purpose, different
target utterances were used to create adversarial examples from
audio samples of different lengths. The results are plotted in
Figure 7. For the evaluations, 500 iterations and λ = 20 were
used. Each point of the graph was computed based on 200
adversarial examples with changing targets and different audio
samples, all of them speech.
Figure 7 shows that the WER increases clearly with an
increasing phone rate. We observe a minimum for 4 phones
per second, which does not change significantly at a smaller
rate. As the time to calculate an adversarial sample increases
with the length of the audio sample, 4 phones per second is a
reasonable choice.
3) Number of Required Repetitions: We also analyzed the
number of iterations needed to obtain a successful adversarial
example for a randomly chosen audio input and target text.
The results are shown in Figure 8. We tested our approach
for speech and music, setting λ = 0, λ = 20, and λ = 40,
respectively. For the experiments, we randomly chose speech
files from 150 samples and music files from 72 samples. For
each sample, a target text was chosen randomly from 120
predefined texts. The only constraint was that we used only
audio-text-pairs with a phone rate of 6 phones per second or
less, based on the previous phone rate evaluation. In the case
of a higher phone rate, we chose a new audio file. We repeated
the experiment 100 times for speech and for music and used
these sets for each value of λ.
For each round, we ran 100 iterations and checked the
transcription. If the target transcription was not recognized
successfully, we started the next 100 iterations and re-checked,
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Fig. 7: Accuracy for different phone rates. To create the
examples, 500 iterations of backpropagation and λ = 20 are
used. The vertical lines represent the variances.
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Fig. 8: Success rate as a function of the number of iterations.
The upper plot shows the result for speech audio samples and
the bottom plot the results for music audio samples. Both sets
were tested for different settings of λ.
repeating until either the maximum number of 5000 itera-
tions was reached or the target transcription was successfully
recognized. An adversarial example was only counted as a
success if it had a WER of 0 %. There were also cases were no
success was achieved after 5000 iterations. This varied from
only 2 cases for speech audio samples with λ = 40 up to
9 cases for music audio samples with λ = 0.
In general, we can not recommend using very small values
of λ with too many iterations, as some noise is added during
each iteration step and the algorithm becomes slower. Even
though the results in Figure 8 show that it is indeed possible
to successfully create adversarial samples with λ set to zero,
but 500 or 1000 iterations may be required. Instead, to achieve
a higher success rate, it is more promising to switch to a higher
value of λ, which often leads to fewer distortions overall than
using λ = 0 for more iterations. This will also be confirmed by
the results of the user study, which are presented in Section V.
The algorithm is easy to parallelize and for a ten-second
audio file, it takes less than two minutes to calculate the
adversarial perturbations with 500 backpropagation steps on
a 6-core (12 threads) Intel Core i7-4960X processor.
E. Comparison
We compare the amount of noise with Commander-
Song [61], as their approach is also able to create targeted
attacks using Kaldi and therefore the same DNN-HMM-based
ASR system. Additionally, is the only recent approach, which
reported she signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) of their results.
The SNR measures the amount of noise σ, added to the
original signal x, computed via
TABLE III: Comparison of SNR with CommanderSong [61],
best result shown in bold print.
None 40 dB 20 dB 0 dB CommanderSong [61]
SNR 15.88 17.93 21.76 19.38 15.32
SNR(dB) = 10 · log10
Px
Pσ
,
where Px and Pσ are the energies of the original signal and
the noise. This means, the higher the SNR, the less noise was
added.
Table III shows the SNR for successful adversarial samples,
where no hearing thresholds are used (None) and for differ-
ent values of λ (40 dB, 20 dB, and 0 dB) in comparison to
CommanderSong. Note, that the SNR does not measure the
perceptible noise and therefore, the resulting values are not
always consistent with the previously reported φ. Nevertheless,
the results show, that in all cases, even if no hearing thresholds
are used, we achieve higher SNRs, meaning, less noise was
added to create a successful adversarial example.
V. USER STUDY
We have evaluated the human perception of our audio
manipulations through a two-part user study. In the transcrip-
tion test, we verified that it is impossible to understand the
voice command hidden in an audio sample. The MUSHRA
test provides an estimate of the perceived audio quality of
adversarial examples, where we tested different parameter
setups of the hiding process.
A. Transcription Test
While the original text of a speech audio sample should
still be understandable by human listeners, we aim for a result
where the hidden command cannot be transcribed or even
identified as speech. Therefore, we performed the transcription
test, in which test listeners were asked to transcribe the
utterances of original and adversarial audio samples.
1) Study Setup: Each test listener was asked to transcribe
21 audio samples. The utterances were the same for everyone,
but with randomly chosen conditions: 9 original utterances,
3 adversarial examples with λ = 0, λ = 20, and λ = 40
respectively and 3 difference signals of the original and
the adversarial example, one for each value of λ. For the
adversarial utterances, we made sure that all samples were
valid, such that the target text was successfully hidden within
the original utterance. We only included adversarial examples
which required ≤ 500 iterations.
We conducted the tests in a soundproofed chamber and
asked the participants to listen to the samples via headphones.
The task was to type all words of the audio sample into a blank
text field without any provision of auto-completion, grammar,
or spell checking. Participants were allowed to repeat each
audio sample as often as needed and enter whatever they
understood. In a post-processing phase, we performed manual
corrections on minor errors in the documented answers to
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Fig. 9: WER for all 21 utterances over all test listeners of the
original utterances and the adversarial utterances.
address typos, misspelled proper nouns, and numbers. We
provide an example of the post-processing in Appendix A.
After revising the answers in the post-processing step, we
calculated the WER using the same algorithms as introduced
in Section IV-B1.
2) Results: For the evaluation, we have collected data from
22 listeners during an internal study at our university. None of
the listeners were native speakers, but all had sufficient English
skills to understand and transcribe English utterances. As we
wanted to compare the WER of the original utterances with
the adversarial ones, the average WER of 12.52 % overall test
listeners was sufficient. This number seems high, but the texts
of the WSJ are quite challenging. All original transcriptions
and target transcriptions are presented in Appendix B. For the
evaluation, we ignored all cases where only the difference of
the original and adversarial sample was played. For all of these
cases, none of the test listeners was able to recognize any kind
of speech and therefore no text was transcribed.
For the original utterances and the adversarial utterances,
an average WER of 12.59 % and 12.61 % was calculated. The
marginal difference shows that the difference in the audio does
not influence the intelligibility of the utterances. Additionally,
we have tested the distributions of the original utterances and
the adversarial utterances with a two-sided t-test to verify
whether both distributions have the same mean and variance.
The test with a significance level of 1 % shows no difference
for the distributions of original and adversarial utterances.
In the second step, we have also compared the text from the
test listeners with the text which was hidden in the adversarial
examples. For this, we have measured a WER far above 100 %,
which shows that the hidden text is not intelligible. Also, there
are only correct words which were in the original text, too,
and in all cases these were frequent, short words like is, in,
or the.
B. MUSHRA Test
In the second part of the study, we have conducted a Mul-
tiple Stimuli with Hidden Reference and Anchor (MUSHRA)
test, which is commonly used to rate the quality of audio
signals [46].
1) Study Setup: The participants were asked to rate the
quality of a set of audio signals with respect to the original
signal. The set contains different versions of the original audio
signal under varying conditions. As the acronym shows, the
set includes a hidden reference and an anchor. The former
is the sample with the best and the latter the one with the
worst quality. In our case, we have used the original audio
signal as the hidden reference and the adversarial example,
which was derived without considering the hearing thresholds,
as anchor. Both the hidden reference and the anchor are
used to exclude participants, who were not able to identify
either the hidden reference or the anchor. As a general rule,
the results of participants who rate the hidden reference with
less than 90 MUSRHA-points more than 15 % of the time
are not considered. Similarly, all results of listeners who rate
the anchor with more than 90 MUSRHA-points more than
15 % of the time are excluded. We used the webMUSHRA
implementation, which is available online and was developed
by AudioLabs [47].
We have prepared a MUSHRA test with nine different
audio samples, three for speech, three for music, and three
for recorded twittering birds. For all these cases, we have
created adversarial examples for λ = 0, λ = 20, λ = 40,
and without hearing thresholds. Within one set, the target text
remained the same for all conditions, and in all cases, all
adversarial examples were successful with ≤ 500 iterations.
The participants were asked to rate all audio signals in the
set on a scale between 0 and 100 (0–20: Bad, 21–40: Poor,
41–60: Fair, 61–80: Good, 81–100: Excellent). Again, the
listening test was conducted in a soundproofed chamber and
via headphones.
2) Results: We have collected data from 30 test listeners,
3 of whom were discarded due to the MUSHRA exclusion
criteria. The results of the remaining test listeners are shown
in Figure 10 for all nine MUSHRA tests. In almost all cases,
the reference is rated with 100 MUSHRA-points. Also, the
anchors are rated with the lowest values in all cases.
We tested the distributions of the anchor and the other
adversarial utterances in one-sided t-tests. For this, we used
all values for one condition overall nine MUSHRA tests. The
tests with a significance level of 1 % show that in all cases,
the anchor distribution without the use of hearing thresholds
has a significantly lower average rating than the adversarial
examples where the hearing thresholds are used. Hence, there
is a clear perceptible difference between adversarial examples
with hearing thresholds and adversarial examples without
hearing thresholds.
During the test, the original signal was normally rated higher
than the adversarial examples. However, it has to be considered
that the test listeners directly compared the original signal with
the adversarial ones. In an attack scenario, this would not be
the case, as the original audio signal is normally unknown
to the listeners. Despite the direct comparison, there is one
MUSRHA test where the adversarial examples with hearing
thresholds are very frequently rated with a similar value as
the reference and more than 80 MUSHRA-points. This is the
case for the second test with twittering birds, which shows that
there is a barely perceptible difference between the adversarial
samples and the original audio signal.
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Fig. 10: Ratings of all test listeners in the MUSHRA test. We
tested three audio samples for speech, music, and twittering
birds. The left box plot of all nine cases shows the rating of
the original signal and therefore shows very high values. The
anchor is an adversarial example of the audio signal that had
been created without considering hearing thresholds.
Additionally, we observed that there is no clear preference
for a specific value of λ. The samples with λ = 0 received
a slightly higher average rating in comparison to λ = 20 and
λ = 40, but there is only a significant difference for the
distributions of λ = 0 and λ = 40. This can be explained
with the different number of iterations, since, as shown in
Section IV-D3, for a higher value of λ, fewer iterations are
necessary and each iteration can add noise to the audio signal.
VI. RELATED WORK
Adversarial machine learning techniques have seen a rapid
development in the past years, in which they were shown to be
highly successful for image classifiers. Adversarial examples
have also been used to attack ASR systems, however, there,
the modifications of the signals are usually quite perceptible
(and sometimes even understandable) for human listeners. In
the following, we review existing literature in this area and
discuss the novel contributions of our approach.
A. Adversarial Machine Learning Attacks
There are many examples of successful adversarial attacks
on image files in the recent past and hence we only discuss
selected papers. In most cases, the attacks were aimed at
classification only, either on computer images or real-world
attacks. For example, Evtimov et al. showed one of the first
real-world adversarial attacks [16]. They created and printed
stickers, which can be used to obfuscate traffic signs. For
humans, the stickers are visible. However, they seem very in-
conspicuous and could possibly fool autonomous cars. Athalye
and Sutskever presented another real-world adversarial pertur-
bation on a 3D-printed turtle, which is recognized as a rifle
from almost every point of view [3]. The algorithm to create
this 3D object not only minimizes the distortion for one image,
but for all possible projections of a 3D object into a 2D image.
A similar attack on a universal adversarial perturbation was
presented by Brown et al. [8]. They have created a patch which
works universally and can be printed with any color printer.
The resulting image will be recognized as a toaster without
covering the real content even partially. An approach which
works for tasks other than classification is presented by Cisse
et al. [12]. The authors used a probabilistic method to change
the input signal and also showed results for different tasks but
were not successful in implementing a robust targeted attack
for an ASR system. Carlini et al. introduced an approach with a
minimum of distortions where the resulting images only differ
in a few pixels from the original files [10]. Additionally, they
are robust against common distillation defense techniques [38].
Compared to attacks against audio signals, attacks against
image files are easier, as they do not have temporal dependen-
cies. Note that the underlying techniques for our attack are
similar, but we had to refine them for the audio domain.
B. Adversarial Voice Commands
Adversarial attacks on ASR systems focus either on hiding
a target transcription [9] or on obfuscating the original tran-
scription [12]. Almost all previous works on attacks against
ASR systems were not DNN-based and therefore use other
techniques [9], [63], [54]. Furthermore, none of the existing
attacks used psychoacoustics to hide a target transcription in
another audio signal.
Carlini et al. have shown that targeted attacks against HMM-
only ASR systems are possible [9]. They use an inverse feature
extraction to create adversarial audio samples. However, the
resulting audio samples are not intelligible by humans in
most of the cases and may be considered as noise, but may
make thoughtful listeners suspicious. A different approach was
shown by Vaidya et al. [54], where the authors changed an
input signal to fit the target transcription by considering the
features instead of the output of the DNN. Nevertheless, the
results show high distortions of the audio signal and can easily
be detected by a human.
An approach to overcome this limitation was proposed by
Zhang et al. They have shown that an adversary can hide
a transcription by utilizing non-linearities of microphones to
modulate the baseband audio signals with ultrasound above
20 kHz [63]. The main downside of the attack is the fact that
the information of the necessary features needs to be retrieved
from audio signal, recorded with the specific microphone,
which is costly in practice. Furthermore, the modulation is
12
tailored to a specific microphone an adversary wants to attack.
As a result, the result may differ if another microphone is used.
Song and Mittael [50] and Roy et al. [44] introduced similar
ultrasound-based attacks that are not adversarial examples, but
rather interact with the ASR system in a frequency range
inaudible to humans.
Recently and concurrently, Carlini and Wagner published
a technical report in which they introduce a general targeted
attack on ASR systems using CTC-loss [11]. The attack is
based on a gradient-descent-based minimization [10] (as used
in previous image classification adversarial attacks), but the
loss function is represented via CTC-loss, which is optimized
for time sequences. Compared to our approach, the perceptible
noise level is higher and the attack is less effective, given that
the algorithm needs a lot of time to calculate an adversarial
example since it is based on a grid search.
CommanderSong [61] is also evaluated against Kaldi and
uses backpropagation to find an adversarial example. However,
in order to minimize the noise, approaches from the image do-
main are borrowed. Therefore, the algorithm does not consider
human perception. Additionally, the attack is only shown for
music and the very limited over-the-air attack highly depends
on the speakers and recording devices as the attack parameters
have to be adjusted especially for these components.
Our approach is different from all previous studies on adver-
sarial perturbations for ASR, as we combine a targeted attack
with the requirement that the added noise should be barely,
if at all, perceptible. We use a modified backpropagation
scheme, which has been very successful in creating adversarial
perturbations for image classification and we initialize our
optimization by forced-alignment to further minimize audi-
ble noise.
C. Hiding Information in Audio
Watermarking approaches use human perception to hide
information about an image, video, or audio clip within
itself [5], [14], [57]. The purpose in the case of watermarking,
however, differs from our method and steganography, as it is
used for copyright protection. Watermarking uses algorithms
to hide information in audio signals within the lower fre-
quencies or also with help of a psychoacoustic model [58],
[48]. Differently from watermarking and steganography, the
frequency ranges cannot be chosen arbitrarily when an ASR
system is to be attacked. Instead, the information must be
presented in just those frequency regions, on which the ASR
has been trained.
Audio steganography is motivated by the challenge of hid-
ing additional information in an acoustic carrier signal, e. g.,
for transmitting sensitive information in case of comprehensive
Internet censorship [25]. LSB techniques [2], [26] manipulate
the binary representation of a signal and hide information
in the least significant bits of a signal, which limits the
perceived distortions to a minimum. In contrast to our work,
such schemes ignore the acoustic characteristics of the carrier
signal and achieve their hiding capabilities at the expense of
disrupting the statistical characteristics of the original input.
Modulation-based systems [35], [25] manipulate the carrier
signal in the time or frequency domain to encode information
within the signal characteristics. Such modulations allow the
attacker to consider the frequency or energy features of a
signal and help to provide a less conspicuous manipulation
of the carrier signal. Both classes of steganography systems
aim at hiding information in a legitimate carrier signal but are
focused on creating a protected transmission channel within an
untrusted system. In contrast, while our work is designed to
provide a comparable level of inconspicuousness, we require
the successful transcription of a target message through an
automated speech recognition system, which precludes the use
of watermarking or steganography algorithms here.
VII. DISCUSSION
We have shown that it is possible to successfully attack
state-of-the-art DNN-HMM ASR systems with targeted ad-
versarial perturbations, which are barely or even impossible
to distinguish from original audio samples. Based on different
experiments, we demonstrated that it is possible to find the
best setup for the proposed algorithm for the creation of ad-
versarial examples. However, these results also open questions
regarding possible countermeasures and future work.
A. Parameter Choice
The choice of the parameters highly affects the amount
of perceptible noise. The evaluation has shown that a higher
number of iterations increases the success rate, but simultane-
ously the amount of noise. However, for iterations < 500 the
success rate is already very high and therefore, 500 should
not be exceeded. Additionally, by this choice, the required
calculation time is reduced as well. If the success rate needs
to be raised, the increase of λ had a higher effect. Although the
participants in the MUSHRA test did prefer smaller values for
λ, there was no significant difference if λ was only increased
by 20 dB. Additionally, the phone rate should be set to an
optimum value as this highly affects the success of the attack.
Besides improving the success of the attack, the choice of
the original audio sample greatly influences the quality of
the adversarial example. There might be use cases, where the
original audio sample is fixed, but in general, the choice of
the original sample is free. We recommend using music or
other unsuspicious audio samples, like bird twittering, which
do not contain speech, as speech has to be obfuscated, typically
leading to larger required adversarial perturbations.
The process can be parallelized and is relatively fast in
comparison to other attacks proposed in the past, as we
have integrated the preprocessing into the backpropagation.
Therefore, we recommend to use different promising setups
and to choose that one which sounds the most inconspicuous
while giving the required success rate.
B. Countermeasures
Distillation was shown to be a successful countermeasure
against attacks in image classification [38]. It is a technique
to improve the robustness of classification-based DNNs [21],
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which uses the output of a pre-trained DNN as soft labels in
order to train a second DNN with these soft labels as targets.
However, the transcription of the DNN-based ASR system
not only depends on the classification result but also on the
temporal alignment. Therefore, distillation might not be an
appropriate countermeasure for ASR systems.
A general countermeasure could be to consider human
perception. A very simple version would be to apply MP3 en-
coding to the input data. However, the DNN is not trained for
that kind of data. Nevertheless, we did run some tests on our
adversarial examples. With this setup, the original transcription
could not be recovered, but the target transcription was also
distorted. We assume that training the ASR-DNN with MP3-
encoded audio files will only move the vulnerability into the
perceptible region of the audio files, but will not circumvent
blind spots of DNNs completely.
C. Future Work
One obvious question is whether our attack also works
in a real-world setup. For real-world attacks, different cir-
cumstances have to be considered. This mainly includes the
acoustic transfer function, which is relevant if an audio signal
is transferred over the air. Also, additional noise from different
sources can be present in a real-world environment. In a
controlled environment (e. g., an elevator) it is possible to
calculate the transfer function and to consider or exclude
external noise. Additionally, it is not unusual to have music in
an elevator, which would make such a setup very unsuspicious.
A similar attack can also be imagined for real applications,
e. g., Amazon’s Alexa. However, the detailed architecture of
this system is hard to access and it requires a-priori investi-
gations to obtain that kind of information. It may be possible
to retrieve the model parameters with different model stealing
approaches [51], [36], [56], [39], [24]. For Alexa, our reverse
engineering results of the firmware indicate that Amazon uses
parts of Kaldi. Therefore, a limited knowledge about the
topology and parameters might be enough to create a model
for a black-box attack. A starting point could be the keyword
recognition of commercial ASR systems, e. g., “Alexa.” This
would have the advantage that the keyword recognition runs
locally on the device and would, therefore, be easier to access.
For image classification, universal adversarial perturbations
have already been successfully created [8], [31]. For ASR
systems, it is still an open question if these kinds of adversarial
perturbations exist and how they can be created.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a new method for creating adversarial
attacks on ASR systems, which explicitly take dynamic human
hearing thresholds into account. In this way, borrowing the
mechanisms of MP3 encoding, the audibility of the added
noise is clearly reduced. We perform our attack against the
state-of-the-art Kaldi ASR system and feed the adversarial
input directly into the recognizer in order to show the general
feasibility of psychoacoustics-based attacks.
By applying forced alignment and backpropagation to the
DNN-HMM system, we were able to create inconspicuous
adversarial perturbations very reliably. In general, it is possible
to hide any target transcription within any audio file and,
with the correct attack vectors, it was possible to hide the
noise below the hearing threshold and make the changes
psychophysically almost imperceptible. The choice of the
original audio sample, an optimal phone rate, and forced
alignment give the optimal starting point for the creation of ad-
versarial examples. Additionally, we have evaluated different
algorithm setups, including the number of iterations and the
allowed deviation from the hearing thresholds. The comparison
with another approach in [61], which is also able to create
targeted adversarial examples, shows that our approach needs
far lower distortions. Listening tests have proven that the
target transcription was incomprehensible for human listeners.
Furthermore, for some audio files, it was almost impossible for
participants to distinguish between the original and adversarial
sample, even with headphones and in a direct comparison.
Future work should investigate the hardening of ASR sys-
tems by considering psychoacoustic models, in order to pre-
vent these presently fairly easy attacks. Additionally, similar
attacks should be evaluated on commercial ASR systems and
in real-world attacks with a black-box setting.
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APPENDIX
A. Example of Post-Processing of One Entire Transcription Listening Test
01 original: QUOTE AN EYE FOR AN EYE END QUOTE
01 modified: "QUOTE AN EYE FOR AN EYE END QUOTE
02 original: KAISERTEK DIDN’T NAME SUCCESSORS FOR MISTER MAYER AT ITS POST
02 modified: KAISERTECH DIDN’T NAME SUCCESSORS FOR MR. MAIER AT ITS POST
03 original: BUT ROBERT UNDERWOOD PRESIDENT OF THE GOLDEN GOLF SUBSIDIARY SAID THERE ARE PERFECTLY NATURAL SYNERGIES...
03 modified: BUT ROBERT UNDERWOOD PRESIDENT OF THE GOLDEN GULF SUBSIDIARY SAID THERE ARE PERFECTLY NATURAL SYNERGIES...
03 original: ...BETWEEN THE BUSINESSES
03 modified: ...BETWEEN THE BUSINESSES
04 original: THEY NOTED THAT TIME SQUARE AREA HAS BEEN SLOWLY IMPROVING BECAUSE THE MARKET FOR
04 modified: THEY NOTED THAT TIME SQUARE AREA HAS BEEN SLOWLY IMPROVING BECAUSE THE MARKET FOR
05 original: BUT I HAVE TO LIVE WITH MYSELF
05 modified: BUT I HAVE TO LIVE WITH MYSELF
06 original: XXX SAID ITS CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PETER J POPE MADE THE EARNINGS PROJECTION...
06 modified: POPE AND TALBOT SAID ITS CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PETER T. POPE MADE THE EARNINGS PROJECTION...
06 original: ...TO THE NEW YORKS SECURITY ANALYSTS
06 modified: ...TO THE NEW YORKS SECURITY ANALYSTS
07 original: CONSUMER SPENDING SEARCH POINT SINCE JUNE LET BY AN JUMP IN AUTO SALES
07 modified: CONSUMER SPENDING SEARCH POINT SINCE JUNE LED BY AN JUMP IN AUTO SALES
08 original: BUT NOW THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IS CRACKING
08 modified: BUT NOW THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IS CRACKING
09 original: WILLIAMS LYMAN AND BLOOMENBAUM MR MILKAN HAS RETAINED AN EXPERIENCED TEAM
09 modified: WILLIAMS LIMAN AND FLUMENBAUM MR. MILKEN HAS RETAINED AN EXPERIENCED TEAM
10 original: ----------------------------------------------
10 modified:
11 original: THE NINETEENTH SUMMARY ANUAL REPORT PRODUCED BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE INSTITUTE...
11 modified: THE NINETEENTH SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT PRODUCED BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE INSTITUTE...
11 original: ...PROJECT SHARPLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PAGES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS TYPICALLY FROM TWENTYTWO TO TO TEN
11 modified: ...PROJECT SHARPLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PAGES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS TYPICALLY FROM TWENTY TWO TO TEN
12 original: A THIRD MADE SIGNIFICANT CONTENTS CHANGES SUCH AS MOVING FOOTNOTE MATERIAL INTO THE NARRATIVE USING GRAPHS...
12 modified: A THIRD MADE SIGNIFICANT CONTENTS CHANGES SUCH AS MOVING FOOTNOTE MATERIAL INTO THE NARRATIVE USING GRAPHS...
12 original: ...MORE GENEROUSLY AND REWRITING THE FINANCIAL REVIEW IN LEYMANS TERMS
12 modified: ...MORE GENEROUSLY AND REWRITING THE FINANCIAL REVIEW IN LAYMAN’S TERMS
13 original: THE MARKET HAS TO DO THAT
13 modified: THE MARKET HAS TO DO THAT
14 original: THE WALLOP PUZZLE WOULD COST FIVE POINT FOUR TWO MILLION OVER FIVE YEARS
14 modified: THE WALLOP PUZZLE WOULD COST FIVE POINT FOUR TWO MILLION OVER FIVE YEARS
15 original: -------------------------------------------------------------------
15 modified:
16 original: THE NEW ATTRACTION WHICH HAD BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR MORE THAN FIVE YEARS IS SHEDULED FOR COMPLETION...
16 modified: THE NEW ATTRACTION WHICH HAD BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR MORE THAN FIVE YEARS IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION...
16 original: ...IN 1989
16 modified: ...IN NINETEEN EIGHTY NINE
17 original: THE DISNEY PROJECT IS SHEDULED FOR COMPLETEION IN 1988 AND AN ESTIMATED COST OF...
17 modified: THE DISNEY PROJECT IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION IN NINETEEN EIGHTY EIGHT AND AN ESTIMATED COST OF...
17 original: ...250.000.000
17 modified: ...TWO HUNDRED MILLION
18 original: -------------------------------------------------------------------------
18 modified:
19 original: WELL COLLAGE IN ROMANCE WHERE PROJECTED TO SUFFER WITH THE SHRINKING TEENAGE POPULATION WHICH HASN’T...
19 modified: WELL COLLEGE INROMANCE WERE PROJECTED TO SUFFER WITH THE SHRINKING TEEN AGE POPULATION WHICH HASN’T...
19 original: ...HAPPENED YET
19 modified: ...HAPPENED YET
20 original: INCREASED MARKETING EFFORTS BY MANY SCHOOLS HAVE APPARENTLY HELPED TO STAY OFF THE PROJECTED DECLINE
20 modified: INCREASED MARKETING EFFORTS BY MANY SCHOOLS HAVE APPARENTLY HELPED TO STAY OFF THE PROJECTED DECLINE
21 original: FOR EXAMPLE THE FEDERAL FUNDS RIGHT WICH AVERAGED NEARLY SEVEN AND ONE FOURTH PERCENT TUESDAY FELL TO SIX...
21 modified: FOR EXAMPLE THE FEDERAL FUNDS RIGHT WHICH AVERAGED NEARLY SEVEN AND ONE FOURTH PERCENT TUESDAY FELL TO SIX...
21 original: ...PERCENT LATE YESTERDAY
21 modified: ...PERCENT LATE YESTERDAY
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B. Transcriptions of Transcription Listening Test
Original Transcriptions.
01: "QUOTE AN EYE FOR AN EYE "UNQUOTE
02: KAISERTECH DIDN’T NAME SUCCESSORS FOR MR. MAIER IN HIS POSTS AT THE PARENT
03: BUT ROBERT UNDERWOOD PRESIDENT OF THE GOLDEN GULF SUBSIDIARY SAID THERE WERE PERFECTLY NATURAL SYNERGIES BETWEEN...
...THE BUSINESSES
04: THEY NOTED THAT THE TIMES SQUARE AREA HAS BEEN SLOWLY IMPROVING BECAUSE OF MARKET FORCES
05: BUT I HAVE TO LIVE WITH MYSELF
06: POPE AND TALBOT SAID ITS CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PETER T. POPE MADE THE EARNINGS PROJECTION IN A...
...PRESENTATION TO NEW YORK SECURITIES ANALYSTS
07: CONSUMER SPENDING SURGED POINT SEVEN PERCENT IN JUNE LED BY A JUMP IN AUTO SALES
08: BUT NOW THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IS CRACKING
09: WILLIAMS LIMAN AND FLUMENBAUM MR. MILKEN HAS RETAINED AN EXPERIENCED TEAM
10: ALL THE EQUITY RAISING IN MILAN GAVE THAT STOCK MARKET INDIGESTION LAST YEAR
11: THE NINETEEN SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORTS PRODUCED BY PARTICIPANTS IN THE FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES INSTITUTE PROJECT SHARPLY...
...REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PAGES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS TYPICALLY FROM TWENTY TWO TO TEN
12: A THIRD MADE SIGNIFICANT CONTENTS CHANGES SUCH AS MOVING FOOTNOTE MATERIAL INTO THE NARRATIVE USING GRAPHS MORE...
...GENEROUSLY AND REWRITING THE FINANCIAL REVIEW IN LAYMAN’S TERMS
13: THE MARKET HAS TO DO THAT
14: THE WALLOP PROPOSAL WOULD COST FIVE POINT FOUR TWO BILLION DOLLARS OVER FIVE YEARS
15: OUT OF NINETEEN EIGHTY SEVEN’S SPECTACULAR WORLD WIDE SURGE IN STOCK PRICES HAS COME A DEEPENING CONTROVERSY OVER...
...WHETHER U. S. STOCKS ARE OVERPRICED
16: THE NEW ATTRACTION WHICH HAD BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR MORE THAN FIVE YEARS IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION IN...
...NINETEEN EIGHTY NINE
17: THE DISNEY PROJECT IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION IN NINETEEN EIGHTY EIGHT AT AN ESTIMATED COST OF TWO HUNDRED AND...
...FIFTY MILLION
18: SPECIFICALLY THE UNION SAID IT WAS PROPOSING TO PURCHASE ALL OF THE ASSETS OF THE OF UNITED AIRLINES INCLUDING...
...PLANES GATES FACILITIES AND LANDING RIGHTS
19: WHILE COLLEGE ENROLMENTS WERE PROJECTED TO SUFFER WITH THE SHRINKING TEEN AGE POPULATION IT HASN’T HAPPENED YET
20: INCREASED MARKETING EFFORTS BY MANY SCHOOLS HAVE APPARENTLY HELPED STAVE OFF THE PROJECTED DECLINE
21: FOR EXAMPLE THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE WHICH AVERAGED NEARLY SEVEN AND ONE FOURTH PERCENT TUESDAY FELL TO SIX PERCENT...
...LATE YESTERDAY
Target Transcriptions.
01: DO NOT BLAME YOU
02: THE COMMAND IS PLANTED
03: THE CAKE IS A LIE
04: THE COMMAND IS IN MY BRAIN
05: I’M AN INVADER COMING FOR YOU
06: WINTER IS COMING ZOMBIE COMING
07: IN MY RIGHT HAND
08: PRINCESS IN THE CASTLE
09: THEY DON’T BLAME YOU FIND A BOY
10: WELCOME TO THE JUNGLE ZOMBIE COMING WINTER IS COMING
11: THE CAKE IS A LIE DON’T BLAME YOU
12: I BELIEVE MOST PEOPLE ARE GOOD
13: THE HEAD THEY ARE STILL FIGHTING
14: I BELIEVE ALL PEOPLE ARE GOOD
15: THE SOUND OF SILENCE
16: IN THE MONEY CASTLE
17: WINTER IS COMING
18: DEACTIVATE SECURITY CAMERA AND UNLOCK FRONT DOOR
19: HE IS A MAN HE’S A GHOST
20: INTO YOUR FACE
21: TODAY I AM GOING NOWHERE
18
